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Living Trusts
and Tax Avoidance
By HAYES R. HINDRY*
In February of 1940, the United States Supreme Court made a
decision which radically affects the use of the living trust as an income
tax avoidance device. This is the case of Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U. S. 331. In this case, the taxpayer established a trust for the exclusive benefit of his wife. The trust was for a period of five years. During
that period, the taxpayer was named as trustee of the trust. So much
of the income was to be paid to the beneficiary as the trustee deemed
proper. At the end of the five-year period, the trustee was to distribute
the corpus to the grantor, and any accumulated income to the beneficiary.
The Trust instrument provided the normal trustee powers of investment, sale, collection of income, compromise of claims, holding of assets
in the name of a nominee, limitation of liability of the trustee, and
spendthrift clause. The taxpayer, upon the establishment of this trust,
paid a gift tax. All of the income was distributed to the beneficiary
during the first year of the trust. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the entire income to the grantor. The Board of Tax
Appeals sustained the Commissioner, and the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed it. The Supreme Court said, "We granted certiorari'because of
the importance to the revenue of the use of such short term trusts in the
reduction of surtaxes."
It is to be noted before proceeding to the decision in this case that
Section 166 of the Revenue Act specifically deals with income from
trusts, apparently establishing a criterion or standard for the determination of the individual to whom the income shall be taxable. Section
22 (a) of the Act states that gross income includes
"gains, profits and income derived * * * from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of
or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends,
securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or
profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.
*Of the Denver Bar.
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The court elected to determine the responsibility for the tax exclusively upon the basis of this Section 22 (a), rather than Section 166.
In its decision it stated:
"Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or
conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may
construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic
issue. That issue is whether the grantor after the trust has been
established may still be treated, under this statutory scheme, as the
owner of the corpus. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S.5, 12,
57 S. Ct. 330, 333, 81 L. Ed. 465. In absence of more precise
standards or guides supplied by statute or appropriate regulations,
the answer to that question must depend on an analysis of the terms
of the trust and all the circumstances attendant on its creation and
operation. And where the grantor is the trustee and the beneficiaries are members of his family group, special scrutiny of the
arrangement is necessary test what is in reality but one economic
unit be multiplied into two or more by devices which, though valid
under state law, are not conclusive so far as Section 22 (a) is concerned.
"In this case we cannot conclude as a matter of law that
respondent ceased to be the owner of the corpus after the trust was
created. Rather, the short duration of the trust, the fact that the
wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of control over the corpus by respondent all lead irresistibly to the conclusion that respondent continued to be the owner for purposes of Section 22 (a).
"So far as his dominion and control were concerned it seems
clear that the trust did not effect any substantial change. In substance his control over the corpus was in all essential respects the
same after the trust was created as before. The wide powers which
he retained included for all practical purposes most of the control
which he as an individual would have. There were, we may assume, exceptions, such as his disability to make a gift of the corpus.
to others during the term of the trust and to make loans to himself.
But this dilution in his control would seem to be insignificant and
immaterial, since control over investment remained. If it be said
that such control is the type of dominion exercised by any trustee,
the answer is simple. We have at best a temporary reallocation of
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income within an intimate family group. Since the income remains
in the family and since the husband retains control over the investment, he has rather complete assurancethat the trust will not effect
any substantial change in his economic position. It is hard to
imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer after this trust had
been executed or, if he did, that it had any rational foundation in
fact. For as a result of the terms of the trust and the intimacy of
the familial relationship respondent retained the substance of full
enjoyment of all the rights which previously he had in the property. That might not be true if only strictly legal rights were
considered. But when the benefits flowing to him indirectly
through the wife are added to the legal rights he retained, the aggregate may be said to be a fair equivalent of what he previously
had. To exclude from the aggregate those indirect benefits would
be to deprive Section 22 (a) of considerable vitality and to treat
as immaterial what may be highly relevant considerations in the
creation of such family trusts. For where the head of the household has income in excess of normal needs, it may well make but
little difference to him (except income-tax-wise) where portions
of that income are routed-so long as it stays in the family group.
In those circumstances'the all-important factor might be retention
by him of control over the principal. With that control in his
hands, he would keep direct command over all that he needed to
remain in substantially the same financial situation as before. Our
point here is that no one fact is normally decisive but that all considerations and circumstances of the kind we have mentioned are
relevant to the question of ownership and are appropriatefoundations for findings on that issue. Thus, where, as in this case, the
benefits directly or indirectly retained blend so imperceptibly with
the normal concepts of full ownership, we cannot say that the triers
of fact committed reversible error when they found that the husband was the owner of the corpus for the purposes of Section
22 (a). To hold otherwise would be to treat the wife as a complete stranger; to let mere formality obscure the normal consequences of family solidarity; and to force concepts of ownership
to be fashioned out of legal niceties which may have little or no
significance in such household arrangements.
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"The bundle of rights which he retained was so substantial
that respondent cannot be heard to complain that he is the 'victim
of despotic power when for the purpose of taxation he is treated
as owner altogether.' See Du Pont v. Commissioner, 289 U. S.
685, 689, 53 S. Ct. 766, 77 L. Ed. 1447." (Italics ours.)
The effect of this decision cannot be minimized. For under it,
apparently, the doors are open for determination that the income of any
living trust established by a husband or wife for the benefit of the other,
or, for that matter, any living trust established by any member of a family for the benefit of another member of a family, might very readily,
under the language of this decision, be determined to be taxable to the
grantor during his lifetime.
The confusion which this decision has caused in the minds of the
jurists and lesser courts throughout the land can be readily seen by a
reading of the cases which have been determined since then, c. f., Helvering v. Hormel, 111 Fed. 2nd 1; Helvering v. Achelis, 112 Fed. 2nd
928; Commissioner v. Branch, 114 Fed. 2nd 985; White v. Higgins,
First Circuit, decided December 12, 1940; Commissioner v. Berolzheimer, Second Circuit, decided December 23, 1940.
The Achelis case above referred to seems to me to contain the best
statement of the rationale of this case when the court there said:
"The rationale of that decision was that the nexus of powers
reserved by the settlor so nearly approached full dominion as to be
its equivalent; the court did not suggest that the settlor of a trust
could not so completely sever himself from the income of property
for a period-even for a short period-as to make it no longer his."
That this decision is only the first step by the Internal Revenue
Department in an attempt ultimately to destroy the use of living trust
estates as an income tax avoidance measure is clearly indicated by the
numerous times that that case has been made the basis of an attempt to
present hitherto unheard of claims by the Revenue Department. To
what extent they will be successful remains yet to be determined, although we must admit that the language of this decision makes it quite
evident that a great part of the road to this ultimate destination has
already been covered.

DICTA

CORRECTION
In the article entitled, "Possibility of a Reverter as a Taxable
Entity," which appeared in the January issue of DICTA, a note was
attached citing a recent treasury decision which was later incorporated
into Article 17, Regulation 70, of the Inheritance Tax Department.
Unfortunately, an error was made which materially changed the meaning of this Regulation. The author states that the correct text of this
Regulation is:
"Where the transfer was made during the period between
November 11, 1935 (that being the date upon which the Supreme
Court of the United States rendered its decisions in the cases of
Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, and Becker
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48) and January 29,
1940 (that being the date upon which such Court rendered its decisions in Helvering v. Hallock and companion cases, 309 U. S. 106),
and the Commissioner, whose determination therein shall be conclusive, determines that such transfer is classifiable with the transfers involved in such two cases decided on November 11, 1935,
rather than with the transfer involved in the case of Klein v. United
States, 283 U. S. 23 1, previously decided by such Court, then the
property so transferred shall not be included in the decedent's gross
estate under the provisions of this article, if the following condition
is also met: Such transfer shall have been finally treated for all
gift tax purposes, both as to the calendar year of such transfer and
subsequent calendar years, as a gift in an amount measured by the
value of the property undiminished by reason of a provision in the
instrument of transfer by which the property, in whole or in part,
is to revert to the decedent should he survive the donee or another
person, or the reverting thereof is conditioned upon some other
contingency terminable by decedent's death."

Junior Bar Meetings
According to plans announced by John W. O'Hagan, chairman of
the Junior Bar Conference, regional meetings of the conference will be
held at each of the localities where legal institutes are scheduled. The
first meeting of the conference will be held at Greeley on March 14, at
12 o'clock. All lawyers under the age of 36 are invited and urged to
attend.
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